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What Distinguishes EMAS Participants? An Exploration of Company
Characteristics
Summary
Empirical research on the characteristics of environmentally responsive companies has
focussed almost exclusively on US and Japanese firms. For Europe, which is commonly
considered as the greenest of the three major developed economic markets, similar
research is lacking. This paper seeks to fill this gap by empirically investigating the
business and financial characteristics, stakeholder pressure and public policies
distinguishing companies that have implemented the European Eco-Management and
Audit System (EMAS) and those that have not using a unique firm-level dataset of
European publicly quoted companies. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First of
all, the decision to implement EMAS has not been widely analysed. Secondly, we focus
on European firms which allows us to assess if and to what extent European firms
behave like their US or Japanese counterparts. We find that the EMAS participation
decision is positively influenced by the solvency ratio, the share of non-current
liabilities and the average labour cost. Also, two measures of company size are
positively associated with EMAS participation: both the absolute company size as well
as the relative size of a company compared to its sector average. The profit margin on
the other hand exerts a negative influence according to our results. We further show that
public policy can heavily influence the EMAS participation decision: companies whose
headquarters is located in a member state that actively encourages EMAS have a higher
probability of participation.
Keywords: EMAS, European Companies, Public Policy
JEL classification: L2
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1. INTRODUCTION

In response to increasing stakeholder pressure, companies are embracing
the “corporate social responsibility” concept evermore tightly. Social,
environmental and sustainability reports are being published at an
accelerating pace. Participation in voluntary environmental approaches is a
straightforward manner to show a corporation’s involvement. Within the
wide scope of voluntary approaches, public voluntary programmes have an
attractive appeal. In such programmes participating firms agree to standards
that have been developed by public bodies such as environmental agencies
(OECD, 1999). Well-known examples include environmental management
systems (EMS) like the worldwide ISO 14001 standard and the European
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), programmes developed by
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) such as Energy Star, Green
Lights, and 33/50 and numerous environmental or social product labels. The
appealing character lies in the fact that the credibility of these programmes
is guaranteed by the initiators’ public function and the external validation of
a company’s compliance with the programme. As most programmes allow
the use of a logo, they are attractive instruments for companies to signal
their pro-active stance to various stakeholders. Furthermore, some
programmes provide participants with regulatory relief, subsidies or
information sharing initiatives.
Not surprisingly, some of these initiatives are booming. The number of
ISO 14001 certified companies has risen from 14,106 in December 1999 to
111,162 in five years time (ISO, 2006). Participation in EMAS has tripled to
3,389 organisations between 1997 and 20061. A growth of 127% of the
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number of fairtrade certified producers has been experienced between 2001
and 2005 (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2006).
The question that emerges, is what causes some firms to pursue a proactive strategy by participating in these programs whereas other companies
seem to prefer a defensive strategy? To answer this question this paper
examines the characteristics of large publicly quoted European companies
that have adopted EMAS. EMAS was implemented by the Council
Regulation (EEC) No 1836/93 of June 1993 allowing voluntary
participation by companies in the industrial sector in a community ecomanagement and audit scheme. The regulation was replaced by Regulation
No 761/2001 of 19 March 2001 whereby participation was opened to all
sectors of economic activity, which enables us to analyse company
behaviour in all sectors of economic activity and to draw conclusions that
are not restricted to only a subset sectors. The scheme provides companies
with a means to manage their environmental impacts and to improve their
overall environmental performance. Next to the general requirements of
installing an ISO 14001-like EMS, EMAS places special attention to the
following elements: legal compliance, improvement of environmental
performance, external communication and employee involvement. EMAS is
considered as the standard of environmental excellence and is more
stringent and demanding than ISO 14001 (e.g. Kollman and Prakash, 2002;
Watson and Emery, 2004). Consequently the number of EMAS registered
companies is rather small compared to the number of ISO 14001 certified
ones. In December 2005, ISO 14001 outnumbered EMAS by a factor 10 in
the EU-15. As such it can be argued that the decision to participate in
EMAS is taken more thoughtfully and hence EMAS provides us with a
better indicator of environmentally conscious companies.
The literature on environmentally responsive firms is rather elaborate. A
wide range of internal characteristics (e.g. capital intensity, size,
profitability and financial structure) as well as external drivers (e.g. pressure
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from regulators, consumers, investors and local community) have been
examined. As a literature survey of Alberini and Segerson (2002) however
points out, the evidence on many determinants is not conclusive. Our
research distinguishes itself from previous research in two ways. First is the
voluntary approach under study: EMAS. Related research focused on ISO
14001 (Nakamura et al., 2001; Hibiky et al., 2003; Potoski and Prakash
2005) or on the comprehensiveness of environmental management practices
implemented (Dasgupta et al., 2000; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al.,
2004; Cole et al., 2006). As EMAS is perceived as being more demanding
than ISO 14001, it may present a better picture of environmental
responsiveness. Next to explaining the adoption of an EMS, a number of
studies have focussed on the participation decision towards several US
EPA’s voluntary programmes such as the 33/50 program (Arora and Cason,
1995 and 1996; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Videras and Alberini, 2000),
Green Lights (DeCanio and Watkins, 1998; Videras and Alberini, 2000) and
Waste Wi$e (Videras and Alberini, 2000). King and Lenox (2000) studied
companies’ participation decision in the Chemical Industry’s Responsible
Care Program. Finally, Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) examined the
motivations explaining firms’ formulation of an environmental plan.
Second, this is the first study on the characteristics of green companies
that uses a European firm-level dataset. Previous research has focused
principally on US companies (Arora and Cason, 1995 and 1996; DeCanio
and Watkins, 1998; Khanna and Damon, 1999; King and Lenox, 2000;
Videras and Alberini, 2000; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 2004;
Potoski and Prakash, 2005). Studies on ISO 14001 are mainly based on a
sample of Japanese companies (Nakamura et al., 2001; Hibiky et al., 2003;
Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Cole et al., 2006). Henriques and Sadorsky
(1996) took a sample of Canadian companies and Mexican companies were
the subjects of the study of Dasgupta et al. (2000).

4
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Within the wide range of potential determinants for environmentally
responsive behaviour, this paper focuses on business and financial
indicators, stakeholder pressure and public policy. The results indicate that a
company’s financial structure, profitability, size and average labour cost are
significant drivers of EMAS registration. Besides the nature of its activities
and the location of its headquarters influence the likelihood of participation.
The paper is structured in the following sections. Section two presents
the data and the model. Consequently the hypotheses and variables are
discussed in section three. Section four presents the estimation results and
section five concludes.

2. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This paper merges two firm-level datasets that, as far as we are aware,
have not previously been combined. The first consists of the list of EMAS
registered organisations (received from the EMAS helpdesk on the 25th of
October, 2005). The second, the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk
Electronic Publishing, update 131, August 2005), provides company-level
data. Amadeus (Analyse Major Databases from European Sources) is a
comprehensive, pan-European database containing financial information on
approximately 8 million private and public companies in 38 European
Countries. Both databases were linked using a companies ISIN
(International Securities Identification Number) number. The ISIN number
is a code that uniquely identifies a specific security and is accepted as
standard by virtually all countries.
Our sample uses data from companies listed in the Dow Jones STOXX
600 Monthly Selection list of November 20052. This list registers the largest

2
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publicly quoted companies from the EU-15, Norway and Switzerland. In
November 2005 there were 968 companies on this list of which 74 were
marked as EMAS registered. From this list, we excluded a number of
companies. First we eliminated holding companies (Nace Revision 1.1
codes 7414 and 7415) because we believe their idiosyncratic characteristics
might distort the results. Secondly, due to data limitations, we did not
include companies not covered in Amadeus (especially banks and insurance
companies) or companies with missing values on some items. Thirdly we
eliminated companies with less then 500 employees3. This resulted in a final
sample of 436 observations of which 38 (8,7%) are EMAS participants4.
The number of participants in the total sample (8,7%) is low, but in line
with some previous research (e.g. Arora and Cason, 1996; King and Lenox,
2000; Potoski and Prakash, 2005). As table I in appendix shows, the results
presented in this paper are not substantially different from the results when
all companies for which all data is available are included.
The sample consists of a quite homogeneous set of large and publicly
quoted companies. Due to their visibility it is quite plausible to assume that
all of them face at least some public scrutiny, receive a lot of cover in the
financial press and face financial analysts who track and evaluate their
performance on a daily basis. Probably most of these companies have
several environmental and/or social projects running, publish sustainability
reports and have, to some extent, implemented environmental management
practices. Presumably a rather high percentage is ISO 14001 certified. It
should be noted that whereas ISO 14001 and EMAS are generally presented
as substitutes, this should not be the case. Although there are no official
numbers it is safe to assume that a number of companies have implemented
3

This was done due to our doubts on the accuracy of these data. 53 companies were lost.
The EMAS helpdesk lists all organisations at facility level. Our sample however consists
of companies at group level. As such following Nakamura et al. (2001) and Hibiki et al.
(2003), an organisation was marked as EMAS participant if at least one of its facilities was
registered.
4
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both standards. In June 1998, close to half of the companies that were
EMAS-registered also held an ISO 14001 certificate, while another third
intended to go for ISO 14001 certification (Hillary, 1998). Moreover, with
the revision of the EMAS regulation of 2001, ISO 14001 is considered as
fulfilling the management system element of EMAS. This was done with
the explicit aim to induce ISO 14001 certified companies to take an
additional effort to become EMAS. As such, our analysis might reveal the
characteristics identifying those companies that have taken the extra step.
As EMAS is a voluntary scheme, companies’ participation decision will
follow from a comparison of the monetary and non-monetary costs and
benefits. Assume that both discounted monetary and non-monetary costs (C)
and benefits (B) are influenced by the business characteristics (b) of the
firm, the financial characteristics (f) as well as stakeholder pressure and
public policy (s), i.e. C = C(b,f,s) and B = B(b,f,s). One would expect that a
firm would implement EMAS if B>C. However, a company’s net benefit is
not directly observed and one only observes the participation decision. As
such we create the variable D(EMAS)i that takes the value 1 if the i-th
company was EMAS registered on October 25, 2005 and we assume that for
these companies the discounted benefits outweigh the discounted costs
whereas the opposite holds for all other companies for whom the EMAS
variable equals 0 . To examine which characteristics are important, we use a
binary response model and estimate
P [ EMAS = 1] = Λ ( β x )

where Λ is either the cumulative logistic function (logit model) or normal
distribution function (probit model), β is a vector of parameters to be
estimated and x are the characteristics of the firm influencing the costs and
benefits of EMAS and hence, the decision to implement it.

7
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3. DETERMINANTS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIVE
COMPANIES

In this section we outline our main hypotheses and define the related
independent variables. The European scope of the sample limits the
independent variables we were able to include and thus the hypotheses to be
tested. Next to Amadeus, the availability of comparable company-level data
in Europe is limited. As such, although it would be interesting to test
hypotheses on export ratio, R&D, advertising intensity… data limitations
imply this is beyond the scope of this paper. Next the almost non-existence
of comparable firm-level environmental performance data in Europe hinders
testing

whether

EMAS

participants

prove

superior

environmental

performance. Furthermore the fact a number of countries are included in the
sample limits the variables to be included due to comparability problems
with data from national sources.
We found inspiration for the majority of our independent variables in the
literature. In a perfect world one would take the data from year(s) preceding
a company’s registration to EMAS. However, this might also create a bias
as the implementation time is likely to differ between companies and some
variables might be influenced by business cycle fluctuations. Therefore, for
most financial variables that were taken from a company’s balance sheet or
profit and loss statement, we used averages over a 7-year period.

Business characteristics

Companies with a high number of facilities will face more difficulties in
coordinating and monitoring all individual plants. As such the number of
subsidiaries might be a determinant of the need for standardisation of a
company’s environmental policy and operating procedures. An EMS serves

8
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as an instrument to structure the inflow of information and to monitor the
implementation of the corporation’s policy. A higher number of subsidiaries
also serves as a proxy for the visibility of the company. Finally, companies
with a larger number of facilities have a greater likelihood of participation
since a company was considered a participant if at least one of its facilities
volunteered to join. The variable (SUBSIDIARIES) measures the number of
subsidiaries in 2004. The number of subsidiaries was previously examined
by Arora and Cason (1996) and Dasgupta et al. (2000).
It is commonly hypothesised that size of a company positively influences
the participation decision. Possible explanations include the following. First
larger companies are more visible and face greater scrutiny from various
stakeholders (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Videras and Alberini, 2000;
Cole et al., 2006). However, since all the firms in this analysis are publicly
quoted and face scrutiny in the financial press, this reason might not be as
important in our analysis. Second the key role of management is to ensure
coordination of all actions of the many individuals and subgroups in the
organisation. Larger companies face higher coordination costs, as there are
more people and activities to coordinate. As such the need for formal
structures and procedures to ensure that all employees are focussing their
efforts towards the goals set by the management rises (Henriques and
Sadorky, 1996). An EMS might serve as an instrument to reduce these
coordination costs. Third large companies presumably have more financial
and intellectual resources and experience with management standards like
ISO 9001 (Nakamura et al., 2001; Hibiki et al., 2003; Cole et al., 2006).
Here, we measure company size in 2 different ways. First, we use the
average number of employees in the period 1998-2004 (EMPLOYEES).
Secondly, we also created an additional size-variable (RELATIVE SIZE)
that grasps the relative size of a company compared to the sector average.
To do this we divided the number of employees of a specific company by
the average number of all employees in all companies in the same 4 digit

9
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NACE category in the sample. As such this variable compares the size of
the company to that of its sector-competitors.
Next we hypothesise that the higher the average labour costs of a
company, the more likely it is to have implemented EMAS. Higher average
labour costs might represent a higher educated workforce or might refer to
rather unsafe working conditions (e.g. higher wages in the nuclear or
chemical sector). If higher educated people have a higher environmental
awareness, as well the educated workforce as the unsafe working conditions
explanation imply higher incentives to exert pressure on top management
for safe working conditions and pollution abatement efforts. Moreover a
highly skilled workforce will make it easier to implement a complex
management system as they are generally more trainable, adaptable, and
less resistant to change. We took the average costs of employees and
averaged it over the years 1998-2004 to remove business cycle fluctuations.
We will denote this variable with “LABOUR COST”.
A measure for capital intensity was included under the premise that
capital-intensive companies have more complex production technologies;
require more energy and raw materials input and hence have higher
emission levels (Cole et al., 2006). This induces the need for mechanisms to
control these complex and highly polluting processes and in turn provides
greater opportunities and scope for the introduction of clean technologies.
The variable (CAPITAL INTENSITY) is measured by the ratio fixed assets
per employee. Again the average over the years 1998-2004 is taken.
Finally, industry sector dummies are included to take into account
industry-specific characteristics (e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996;
Videras and Alberini, 2000; Hibiki et al., 2003). As such industry-wide
differences with respect to, for instance, pollution intensity, regulatory
burden and public concern are controlled for. Also, it controls for the
differences with respect to the possibility to implement EMAS. As already
noted, some firms were only able to implement it after the revision in 2001.

10
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A company’s activity was grouped based on the NACE classification
Revision 1.1 and grouped into five industry dummies (SECTOR) shown in
table 1. In our empirical test, the mining and quarrying, manufacturing and
construction sector (sector A) is the omitted dummy.

Table 1 Sector dummies
Dummy NACE
Sector A C
D
F
Sector B E
Sector C G

Description






Number of EMAS
companies
16
2
160
21
32
0
25
10
51
0

Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity, gas and water supply
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of
motor vehicles, motorcycles and
personal and household goods
H
 Hotels and restaurants
13
I
 Transport, storage and communication
50
Sector D J
 Financial intermediation
15
K
 Real estate, renting and business
56
activities
Sector E O
 Other community, social and personal
18
service activities
Note: For the other NACE classes there were no companies in the sample

1
1
0
2
1

Financial characteristics

Implementing an EMS can be considered as a voluntary investment in an
intangible asset, which is more likely to occur in companies with a sound
financial structure (Videras and Alberini, 2000). It should be noted that the
primal objective of an EMS is not to increase short-term profits. In fact, the
opposite might be the case. The costs are immediate but the benefits are
uncertain and might only materialise in the long run.
First we include the profit margin as a measure for a company’s
profitability. More profitable companies are supposed to have easy access to
the funds, by retained profits or capital markets (Nakamura et al., 2001).
The variable (PROFITABILITY) is measured by the average profit margin,
defined as profit before taxation on turnover, over the period 1998-2004.

11
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Second we include the solvency ratio (SOLVENCY) and expect a positive
sign. The solvency ratio is calculated as shareholders funds on total assets
and we use averages over 1998-2004.

Stakeholders and public policy

Within the wide range of stakeholders, shareholders and creditors may be
important groups requesting the company to adopt a certified EMS. Both
may require an EMS as a guarantee of good management in general and
environmental risk minimization in particular to safeguard their invested
funds. We hypothesize that the higher the number of shareholders the more
pressure they will exert. Small shareholders have less influence on and
knowledge about the company’s operations and strategy compared to major
shareholders. As a result they have more interest in external verification of
good management to minimize the risk of future environmental liability.
The variable (SHAREHOLDERS) reports the number of shareholders in
2004. A shareholder is reported if he holds at least 1% of the shares.
The pressure that emanates from creditors is measured by the average of
the ratio of the non-current liabilities on total assets over the period 19982004 (NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES). The higher their share in the way
the company is financed, the higher their associated risks. The variable only
reflects the interests of long-term creditors, as we believe short-term
creditors do not have an incentive to push the company’s policy towards
long-term objectives.
Finally, we include the country in which the company’s headquarters is
located. EMAS participation rates differ significantly form country to
country. The national government’s policy is supposed to play pivotal role
in this regard by e.g. facilitating access to information, granting support
funds, shaping attractive public procurement guidelines (e.g. Perkins and
Neumayer, 2004; Delmas, 2002; Kollman and Prakash, 2002). The variable

12
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is created as dummy variable (COUNRTY) that takes the value 1 if a
company’s headquarters is located in Member State that actively encourages
EMAS registration. The classification is based on the number of incentives
(regulatory flexibility, public procurement, support funding and technical
assistance/information support measures) for registered organisations
provided by each country as reported by the European Commission (2004).
For companies in Germany (17 measures), Italy (15), Spain (13) and Austria
(12) the variable takes the value 1. All other countries in the sample have
eight or less incentive measures and are considered as less supportive.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics on the variables.

13
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations)
Variable

unit

Total
sample

EMAS
companies

Non-EMAS
companies

72.99
(121.1)
25.49
(52.12)
1.085
(1.06)
44.68
(20.67)
0.47
(1,57)

156.05
(265.30)
63.66
(102.68)
1.914
(1.46)
51.51
(13.41)
0.54
(0.71)

65.06
(93.68)
21.84
(42.91)
1.006
(0.98)
44.03
(21.13)
0.46
(1.63)

8.89
(10.29)
38.63
(17.72)

8.83
(8.19)
39.12
(11.77)

8.90
(10.48)
38.58
(18.20)

15.70
(18.94)
27.68
(16.14)
0.24
(0.43)

19.42
(22.09)
34.54
(12.08)
0.53
(0.51)

15.35
(18.60)
27.03
(16.34)
0.21
(0.41)

0.48
(0.50)
0.05
(0.23)
0.26
(0.44)
0.16
(0.37)
0.04
(0.20)

0.61
(0.50)
0.26
(0.45)
0.05
(0.23)
0.05
(0.23)
0.03
(0.26)

0.46
(0.50)
0.03
(0.19)
0.28
(0.45)
0.17
(0.37)
0.04
(0.20)

Business characteristics
Subsidiaries

Number

Employees

Number *1000

Relative size

Ratio

Labour cost

Thousand euro

Capital intensity

Million euro

Financial characteristics
Profitability

Percentage

Solvency

Percentage

Stakeholders and public
policy
Shareholders

Number

Non-current liabilities

Percentage

Country

Dummy

Sector dummies
Sector A

Dummy

Sector B

Dummy

Sector C

Dummy

Sector D

Dummy

Sector E

Dummy

4. RESULTS

The first column of table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the logit
model. The corresponding probability values are presented between
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parentheses. As a robustness check, the last column shows the probit results.
The results of both estimations are in line. In the following we concentrate
on the logit model. The goodness of fit measure count R², defined as the
percentage correctly classified observations with the estimated equation is
92.89%. Due to the low number of EMAS registered companies in the
sample, this is however only slightly above the percentage estimated with a
constant probability measured by dividing the number of non-certified
companies by the total sample number (91.28%). The McFadden R² value is
0.33 and as the likelihood ratio statistic equals 85,54, the null hypothesis
that all coefficients are zero is rejected at the 1% significance level.
However it should be noted that in binary regressand models the goodness
of fit is of secondary importance. The sign of the coefficients and their
significance is what matters (Gujarati, 2003).
The second column shows (for the logit model) the change in odds ratio
due to an increase in the independent variable by one unit. For instance, the
coefficient for the variable employees equals 0.009. The corresponding odds
ratio (e0.009) is 1.009. Then we may say that when the independent variable
increases one unit, the odds that the dependent equals 1 increase by a factor
of 1.009, when other variables are controlled for. The closer the odds ratio is
to 1, the less influence the independent variable exerts on the dependent
variable. Equally one can say that when the variable employees increase by
one unit (1000 employees) the odds of being EMAS registered increases by
0.9%. The third column shows the percent increase in the probability of
being certified for a one-unit increase in the independent variable,
controlling for the other variables in the model.

15
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Table 3 Logit estimation results for EMAS certification
Variable

Business characteristics
Subsidiaries
Employees
Relative size
Labour cost
Capital intensity
Financial characteristics
Profitability
Solvency
Stakeholders and public
policy
Shareholders
Non-current liabilities
Country
Sector dummies
Sector B
Sector C
Sector D
Sector E
Constant

Logit
estimation

Percent
increase in
odds

Percent
increase in
probability

Probit
estimation

0.0003
(0.6994)
0.0041*
(0.0581)
0.2575***
(0.0034)
0.0122**
(0.0226)
0.0159
(0.8717)

0.0002
(0.9048)
0.0090**
(0.0253)
0.5047***
(0.0019)
0.0270***
(0.0098)
0.0491
(0.8139)

0.02

0.002

0.90

0.072

65.65

4.940

2.73

0.217

5.04

0.399

-0.0400*
(0.0787)
0.0576***
(0.0068)

-3.92

-0.312

5.93

0.470

0.0058
(0.4702)
0.0458**
(0.0317)
0.7619*
(0.0821)

0.58

0.046

4.69

0.372

114.23

8.266

1.6582***
(0.0048)
-2.6182***
(0.0071)
-2.6320***
(0.0090)
-0.5340
(0.6257)
-7.9945***
(0.0000)

424.97

24.672

-92.71

-8.024

-92.81

-8.033

-41.38

-3.415

-0.0180
(0.1142)
0.0258**
(0.0011)

0.0032
(0.4673)
0.0200*
(0.0528)
0.4673**
(0.0430)
0.9490***
(0.0036)
-1.0677***
(0.0075)
-1.0557**
(0.0165)
-0.2957
(0.5841)
-3.9540***
(0.0000)

436
436
N
-86.2457
-87.5513
Log-likelihood
-129.0158
-129.0158
Rest. log-likelihood
85.540***
82.929***
LR statistic (14)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Prob. (LR statistic)
92.89%
92.66
% correctly classified
0.3315
0.3214
McFadden R²
* , ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively
Note. Probability values are shown in parentheses. LR statistic is a chi-square test
for all slope coefficients jointly equal to zero.
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Next we turn to the significance of the variables. The number of
shareholders, the number of facilities, the capital intensity5 and one sector
dummy are not significant. The insignificance of the number of facilities
corresponds with Arora and Cason (1996) but contradicts with Dasgupta et
al. (2000) who found that being a multi-plant company was the most
influential variable. Whereas the theoretical arguments for the capital
intensity variable were appealing, our unexpected result is also found by
Cole et al. (2006). In their paper, for some measures of a company’s
environmental awareness it even turned out significantly negative. Note
however that three sector dummy variables are significant. These dummies
may partly capture differences in capital intensiveness among companies.
Compared to the mining and quarrying, manufacturing and construction
sector (sector A), companies involved in electricity, gas or water supply
(sector B) are more frequently registered. Companies in the services sectors
C (trade, hotels, restaurants, logistics and communication) and D (financial
intermediation, real estate and business activities) participate significantly
less frequent in EMAS. Notwithstanding this finding was expected as on
average manufacturing companies face higher environmental risks, it should
be taken in account that is was only in April 2001 when the renewed EMAS
scheme was implemented that companies in the service sector were allowed
to participate. Finally, other community, social and personal service
activities (sector E) have no significantly different participation rates
compared to the mining, quarrying, manufacturing and construction sector.
The size of a company, measured by the number of employees, is
significant at the 5% level. Controlling for the absolute number of
employees, the relative size of a company compared to its sector average
turns out positive and significant at 1%6. These results confirm the
5

Taking total assets per employee yields similar results.
When the absolute and relative size of a company are measured based on turnover, the
corresponding coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% respectively 5% level.

6
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expectation that larger companies are more likely to have implemented
EMAS even when controlling for the number of facilities. From the odds
ratio’s, it follows that relative size has the most important influence on the
probability of EMAS implementation. Hence, within a given sector and
controlling for absolute size, we find that especially larger firms implement
EMAS.
Labour cost’s influence on the probability of EMAS implementation is
positive and highly significant. This implies that companies with highly
skilled workforce of with unsafe working conditions have a higher
probability of having implemented EMAS. This corresponds to some extent
with Dasgupta et al.’s (2000) finding that companies in which a higher
proportion

of

employees

followed

postsecondary

education

have

significantly more comprehensive EMS.
When looking at the financial variables, it turns out that the profitability
measure is significant at the 10% level, but has a negative coefficient. In the
probit model, this variable is also negative but no longer significant. Using
alternative measures of profitability such as the return on shareholder funds
or the return on total assets did not alter this result: these alternative
variables turned out negative but insignificant.7 Again this is in contrast
with our a priori expectations, but consistent with the diverging results of
related research. On the one hand, Cole et al. (2006) found a negative
influence whereas Hibiki et al. (2003) found it to be positive. In the results
of De Canio and Watkins (1998), Arora and Cason (1995) and Nakamura et
al. (2001) profits do not seem to have a significant influence on a
company’s environmental responsiveness. This leads to conclude that profit
levels do not seem to exert a decisive (positive) impact on this issue. A
possible explanation for the negative coefficient may be that the need to

However in this case the labour cost variable and the country dummy variable lose their
significance.
7
These results are available upon request from the authors.
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differentiate from competitors is higher in more competitive markets where
profit margins are generally rather moderate.
The coefficient of the solvency ratio is positive and significant.
Furthermore, the higher the share of non-current liabilities the higher the
probability a company is EMAS registered. Both confirm that a solid
financial structure on the long term is favourable for implementing EMAS. 8
The positive sign of non-current liabilities may also point to the pressure
exerted from long-term creditors for the company to demonstrate that it
minimises its (environmental) risks. While the number of shareholders was
positive but not significant, the non-current liabilities are. This seems to
suggest that pressure from external stakeholders is especially relevant for
those who provide long-term debt. With respect to debt variables, the results
reported in the literature are mixed. The debt ratio turns out negative and
significant in Nakamura et al. (2001) and Cole et al. (2006) but insignificant
in Arora and Cason (1995), DeCanio and Watkins (1998) and Hibiki et al.
(2003). These diverging results may partly be explained by a difference in
the way debt is measured. Is debt exclusively measured by current or noncurrent liabilities or as the aggregate of both? Our analysis turns out debt
diminishes the likelihood of participation in EMAS but that especially the
current liabilities exert a strong negative influence whereas the non-current
liabilities on the other hand invoke a positive pressure9.

8

When the percentage of current liabilities takes the place of the non-current liabilities, the
coefficient is negative and significant which supports this claim. However, the solvency
ratio is no longer significant.
9
When we take the debt ratio, defined as the current and non-current liabilities on total
assets, the coefficient is negative and significant at 5%. This points out that debt as such has
a negative influence, but when controlled for the solvency ratio, the impact of current
liabilities is negative whereas non-current liabilities is not. If we include only current
liabilities, the coefficient is negative and significant, if we only include non-current
liabilities; the coefficient is positive but not significant even at the 10% level. Notice that
the aggregate of the variables solvency, non-current and current liabilities by definition
equals one.
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Finally, a stimulating government policy, as reflected by the country
dummy variable, provokes a positive and significant influence. Companies
whose headquarters is located in Germany, Italy, Spain or Austria seem to
get higher incentives to register.

5.CONCLUSIONS

Responding proactively to growing environmental pressure is becoming
a widespread trend among companies. It goes without saying that the level
of commitment however is uneven ranging from environmental leaders to
defensive companies. Empirical research on the characteristics of
environmentally responsive companies has focussed almost exclusively on
US and Japanese firms. For Europe, which is commonly considered as the
greenest of the three major developed economic markets, similar research is
lacking. This paper seeks to contribute by empirically investigating the
business and financial characteristics, stakeholder pressure and public
policies distinguishing companies that have implemented EMAS. A logistic
regression analysis was carried out on a sample of 436 European companies
listed on the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 selection list. Our results indicate that
the solvency ratio, the share of non-current liabilities, the average labour
cost and the company size positively influence the participation decision.
Next to the absolute company size, the relative size of a company compared
to its sector average increases the likelihood of participation. The
profitability on the other hand exerts a negative influence. Also, the location
of a company’s headquarters and the industrial sector determine the
likelihood of EMAS participation.
Overall, our conclusions are in line with related findings from research
carried out in the US and Japan. Although evidence is still limited, this
might point to a rather moderate influence of the institutional context when
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it comes to distinguishing the characteristics of environmentally leading
companies. The literature on the geographical diffusion of EMS on the other
hand points to the decisive role of institutional-related aspects to explain the
diverging adoption rates between countries. Linking these two findings
might be a challenging task for future research.
Another issue that calls for further exploration is the question whether the
adoption of voluntary initiatives makes companies outperform others on
environmental abatement. Clear signals of added value above business-asusual assessments are required to justify that many voluntary initiatives
provide benefits for participants in the form of decreased regulatory
pressure, subsidies or positive publicity. Increasing the amount of and
reliability of environmental information is crucial to enhance transparency
and enable public monitoring efforts. The Toxic Release Inventory in the
US is a forerunner in this regard en has enabled this kind of research. For
now, the findings do not permit an incontestable answer. Unfortunately,
comparable firm level environmental performance data is lacking in Europe.
A database on firm level CO2-emissions created in the wake of the recent
emission-trading directive on greenhouse gas emissions might provide us
with a promising indicator in this regard.
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APPENDIX
Table 4 Sensivity analysis
Variable
Business characteristics
Subsidiaries
Employees
Relative size
Labour cost
Capital intensity
Financial characteristics
Profitability
Solvency
Stakeholders and public policy
Shareholders
Non-current liabilities
Country
Sector dummies
Sector B
Sector C
Sector D
Sector E
Constant

Full sample without
holdings (logit)

Full sample with holding
companies (logit)

0.0004
(0.8089)
0.0079**
(0.0432)
0.5479***
(0.0007)
0.0230**
(0.0350)
-0.1560
(0.5304)

0.0009
(0.5124)
0.0057*
(0.0756)
0.277**
(0.0227)
0.0141*
(0.0725)
-0.3202
(0.1365)

-0.0163
(0.3370)
0.0515**
(0.0161)

-0.0127
(0.3513)
0.0477**
(0.0020)

0.0054
(0.4997)
0.0467**
(0.0273)
0.7594*
(0.0810)

0.0024
(0.7670)
0.0555***
(0.0005)
0.4786
(0.1648)

1.7022***
(0.0043)
-2.3785**
(0.0121)
-2.6861***
(0.0086)
-0.4058
(0.7085)
-7.8039
(0.0000)

1.6543***
(0.0020)
-2.151***
(0.0096)
-0.3201
(0.3847)
-0.4654
(0.6649)
-6.9213***
(0.0000)

N
Log-likelihood
Restricted log-likelihood
LR statistic (14)
Probability (LR statistic)
% correctly classified
McFadden R²

628
474
-145.5351
-88.3601
-186.4544
-132.3320
81.839***
87.944
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
91.40
93.04
0.2195
0.3323
* , ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively
Note. Probability values are shown in parentheses. LR statistic is a chi-square test
for all slope coefficients jointly equal to zero.
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